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EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES
STEVEN LECKIEt

During the course of investigation, police occasionally gather
evidence by conduct which infringes constitutionally guaranteed
rights. This type of evidence is subject to exclusionary rules in both
Canada and the United States. Both jurisdictions have struggled in
dealing with evidence derived from a constitutional infringement.
While the American position seems largely settled, Canadian courts
continue to grapple with the issue. This note compares and
contrasts the two approaches and suggests that Canada and the
United States exclude evidence for fundamentally different
purposes.

I. CLASSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE
There are three distinct classes of evidence: primary evidence,
secondary evidence, and derivative evidence. The following is a
brief description of each, with examples.
1. Primary Evidence

Primary evidence is gained as a direct result of unconstitutional
conduct. Such evidence may be physical or testimonial. 1 For
example, an illegal search yields the seizure of a bloodstained
sweater. The sweater is a direct fruit of the unlawful search and will
be subject to exclusionary rules.

t B.A. (Hons.) (Carleton), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie).
1

W.R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, vol. 4,
2ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1994) at 369.
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2. Secondary Evidence
Secondary evidence is discovered or generated as a result of
primary evidence. For example, having found a blood-stained
sweater as a result of an illegal search, police obtain a statement
from an accused who is present at the scene of the search. This
statement is secondary evidence as it has come to light as a result of
the illegal search.
3. Derivative Evidence
Derivative evidence is actually a subset of secondary evidence. In R.
v. Church of Scientology (No. 2), Southey J. notes this evidence is
"obtained as a result of information learned or leads gained during
[unconstitutional activities]. It is causally connected to the
obtaining of the primary evidence." 2 Having discovered the blood
stained sweater in an illegal search, for example, the police confront
the suspect and obtain a statement. The statement may disclose the
location of the murder weapon (e.g. a knife). If the knife is
discovered as a result of information gleaned from the illegal
search, it is derivative evidence.
II. THE AMERICAN APPROACH
Exclusionary rules have developed differently between states' and
federal courts. This note deals only with the federal exclusionary
rules as developed by the u.s. Supreme Court.
1. The General Exclusion Rule
For many years American courts had no exclusionary remedy
available where evidence was obtained in an illegal manner. This is
not to say the courts did not canvass the matter. 3 However, it was
not until the decision of Mapp v. Ohio4 that the Supreme Court
sent out a firm message that virtually all evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution would be excluded. The intention was

2

1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 341 at 343 (Om. Gen. Div.).
See e.g. Boydv. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 525 (1886); Weeksv. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct.
1359 (1949).
4 Mappv. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81S.Ct.1684 (1961).
3
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to deter unconstitutional behaviour by law enforcement officials. In
Elkins v. United States, the Court held:
The rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guarantee in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.5

The Elkins Court also held that exclusion of evidence is
necessary to ensure that "judicial integrity" remains intact. This
secondary purpose was affirmed in Terry v. Ohid5:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will
not be made party to lawless invasions of the
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus in
our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in
which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion
approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents.
A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the
conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the
constitutional imprimatur. 7

Notwithstanding this recognition of the need to preserve judicial
integrity through the exclusion of evidence, American courts in
more recent cases have relied almost exclusively on deterrence as
the purpose for excluding evidence. 8 Furthermore, the courts have
consistently held that evidence obtained as a result of constitutional
breaches, save limited exceptions, will be subject to an "automatic"
exclusionary rule.

Elkinsv. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) at 217.
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7 Ibid. at 13.
8 United Statesv. Calandria, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613 (1974); United Statesv.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976); Stonev. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct.
3037 (1976); INS. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (1984);
United Statesv. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
5

6

266

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

2. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

American courts are concerned with evidence obtained as a direct
result of constitutional infringements as well as evidence uncovered
from facts discovered by unconstitutional conduct. Evidence of the
latter type (i.e. derivative evidence) has come to be known as "fruit
of the poisonous tree." 9 The phrase has been adopted to signify
evidence which has been tainted as a result of a constitutional
violation. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, Holmes J.
articulated the purpose behind the doctrine:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that
the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If
knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the
knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong
cannot be used by it in the way proposed. 10

Although the tone of this passage suggests that virtually all evidence
obtained as a result of unconstitutional conduct will be excluded,
Justice Holmes acknowledges that situations will arise where the
same evidence will ultimately be admissible. This notion has given
rise to a series of exceptions to the exclusionary rule under the
doctrine of attenuation.
3. Attenuation

Attenuation is a curative doctrine which may sufficiently purge
evidence of its unconstitutional taint to allow for its admission. The
two most prominent attenuation exceptions are the "independent
source" and "inevitable discovery" doctrines.

i. Independent Source
In Wong Sun v. United States, 11 the Supreme Court accepted that
the exclusionary rule will cease to apply in situations where law
enforcement officials have learned of the evidence from an

308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939).
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
WongSunv. UnitedStates,371 U.S.471 (1963).

9 Nardonev. United States,
10 Silverthorne Lumber Co.
11
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"independent source." An independent source is one which existed
completely distinct from the constitutional violation. For example,
if police locate a murder weapon as a result of having taken an
illegal statement from the accused, the murder weapon may be
suppressed. However, if an unknown accomplice later comes
forward of her own volition and provides the police with a
statement identifying the exact location of the murder weapon, this
independent source would allow for the admission of the weapon
into evidence. As LaFave has stated, "the 'independent source'
limitation upon the taint doctrine is unquestionably sound." 12
Quoting from Sutton v. United States, 13 LaFave highlighted the
rationale behind the independent source doctrine as follows:
It is one thing to say that officers shall gain no advantage
from violating the individual's rights; it is quite another
to declare that such a violation shall put him beyond the
law's reach even if his guilt can be proved by evidence
that has been obtained lawfully. l4

The danger inherent in the independent source doctrine is that
once police illegally obtain evidence, it can be difficult to discern
whether the independent source would have truly surfaced
independently. In such a situation, new evidence may have been
generated by information obtained as a result of access to the
tainted evidence. As LaFave points out, a somewhat controversial
approach to this problem has evolved. 15 In both United States v.
Friedland16 and United Stated v. Bacall, I 7 it was held that
unconstitutional conduct which merely leads the police to focus
their investigation should not be viewed as part of an everlasting
taint. This stands in contrast to the argument that for the sake of
deterrence, police should not be permitted to benefit from their
wrong-doings in any way. Despite the early emphasis given to
deterrence, it would appear that the independent source doctrine
has gained wide acceptance and will remain intact.

12
13

Supra note 1 at 374.
Sutton v. United States, 267 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1959).

14 Ibid at 272.
15 Lafave, supra note 1 at 376-381.
!6 United Statesv. Friedland, 441 F.
17

2d 855 (2d Cir. 1971).

United Statesv. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1971).
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ii. Inevitable Discovery
T aimed evidence may also be attenuated through the doctrine of
inevitable discovery. The doctrine operates where evidence obtained
as a result of unconstitutional conduct would inevitably have been
discovered in a lawful manner, had the violation of rights not
occurred. LaFave, referring to Nix v. Williams, 18 states:
[The] inevitable discovery doctrine is analytically similar
to the independent source doctrine, in that both are
intended to ensure that suppression does not outrun the
deterrence objective: the prosecution is neither 'put in a
better position that it would have been if no illegality had
transpired' nor 'put in a worse position simply because of
some earlier police error or misconduct.' 19

The inevitable discovery doctrine has only been applied in the
clearest of cases. In other words, courts have taken the approach
that the doctrine is available where the evidence would have been
discovered; not where the evidence could have been discovered.
Despite some criticism, 20 this doctrine has become firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence. Since its first application in
1943, 21 the inevitable discovery doctrine has been accepted by
federal courts and many state courts.

4. The American Approach: Summary
While other exceptions to the exclusionary rule have arisen in
American courts, most have been rejected. 22 American courts
constantly affirm the notion that creating a vast body of exceptions
to the rule would severely undermine its purpose. The courts have
also made it clear that, for the most part, primary and derivative
evidence will be treated in the same manner. Both types of evidence
are subject to the strict application of the exclusionary rule.

18

Nixv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984).
LaFave, supra note 1 at 381.
See e.g. H.S. Hovikoff, "The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rules" (1974) 74 Colum. L. Rev. 88 at 88-89.
21 Somerv. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
22 For example, some courts have considered the remoteness of the breach in
connection with obtaining the evidence, as well as intervening circumstances which
may have attenuated the taint.
19
20
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In discussing the American approach to the exclusion of
evidence, Professor Bradley asserts:
It is hardly surprising that this system causes great
consternation among both liberals and conservatives.
Liberals criticize the courts, with ample justification, for
ignoring the rules (or, in the case of the Supreme Court,
watering them down) in order to avoid the suppression of
evidence. Conservatives criticize the courts, again with
ample justification, for excluding evidence in cases of
technical and unimportant violations .... 23

Many Americans, particularly conservatives, believe that the u.s.
rules are much more pro-defendant than those of other countries.
These commentators are urging lawmakers to consider the practices
of other countries where the police are afforded greater leeway.
Judge Wilkey, for example, has argued that "one proof of the
irrationality of the exclusionary rule is that no other civilized nation
in the world has adopted it." 24 Professor Bradley remarks that in
adopting a new Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 25 it is interesting
that Canada "chose not only to copy the u.s. Fourth Amendment
virtually verbatim, but also to adopt, as a constitutional
requirement, the much maligned exclusionary rule, albeit in a more
limited form. "26

III. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
1. Exclusion of Evidence in the Pre- Charter Era
Prior to the advent of the Charter in 1982, Canadian courts had the
discretionary power to exclude relevant evidence under the
common law. The exercise of this power rarely led to the exclusion
of evidence, however, save where it was determined that the

23 C. M. Bradley, "The Emerging International Consensus As to Criminal
Procedure Rules" (1993) 14 Mich. J. Int'!. L. 171at171.
24 M. R. Wilkey, "The Exclusionary Rule: Why Supress Valid Evidence?" (1978)
62 JUDICATURE 215 at 216.
2 5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter
Charter].
26 Supra note 23 at 196.
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prejudicial value of the evidence outweighed its probative value. In
fact, even involuntary statements were admissible when their
reliability was confirmed by a subsequent finding of fact. 27 Thus,
for example, if police were able to locate a murder weapon by
forcing the accused to talk, both the murder weapon and the
statement leading to its discovery could be tendered as evidence.
The primary concern in the pre-Charter era was the reliability of the
evidence obtained.2s
2. Section 24(2) of the Charter
The Charter substantially changed the Canadian posmon with
respect to the exclusion of evidence. Section 24 provides:
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by
this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to
a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy
as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.

(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances,
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.

3. The Purpose of Section 24(2) of the Charter
The purpose of section 24(2) of the Charter is not to deter
unconstitutional behaviour on the part of law enforcement officials,
although such result may be a byproduct of the exclusionary
remedy. 29 Instead, section 24(2) is designed to prevent the
administration of justice from being brought into further disrepute
by the admission of evidence obtained in an unconstitutional

27

R. v. Lawrence(l949), 93 C.C.C. 376 (Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. Wray, [1974] S.C.R.
565 [hereinafter Wray].
2s See e.g. Wray, ibid.
29 R. v. Collins, [1987] l S.C.R. 265 at 280-281 [hereinafter Collins].
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manner. 30 This purpose was fully set out by Lamer
was) in the landmark case of R. v. Collins:

J.

(as he then

Misconduct by the police in the investigatory process
often has some effect on the repute of the administration
of justice, but s. 24(2) is not a remedy for police
misconduct, requiring the exclusion of the evidence if,
because of this misconduct, the administration of justice
was brought into disrepute. Section 24(2) could well have
been drafted in that way, but it was not. Rather, the
drafters of the Charter decided to focus on the
admission of evidence in the proceedings, and the
purpose of s. 24(2) is to prevent having the
administration of justice brought into further disrepute by
the admission of the evidence in the proceedings. This
further disrepute will result from the admission of
evidence that would deprive the accused of a fair hearing,
or from judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by
the investigatory and prosecutorial agencies.3 1

Essentially, the primary purpose of section 24(2) is to safeguard a
basic respect for justice in Canada.
4. Section 24(2): A Two-Step Process
As is apparent from the structure of section 24(2), the Canadian
approach to the exclusion of evidence is a two-step process. First,
the evidence sought to be excluded must have been obtained in a
manner that infringed or denied a right or freedom guaranteed by
the Charter. This may be termed the "infringement requirement."
Note here that when a constitutional infringement is found, the
tainted evidence, for the time being, remains admissible. 32 After the
infringement requirement has been satisfied, the second step is to
determine whether the admission of the evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.3 3 The Supreme Court of

30 R. v. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755 at 784.
3! Supra note 29 at 280-281.
32 R. v. McAvena (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 461 at 476 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Kutynec
(1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
33 Collins, supra note 29.
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Canada has set out and approved this two-stage process m a
number of cases.34

i. Stage One: The Infringement Requirement

At the first stage of the exclusion analysis, the applicant must
demonstrate that the events leading to the discovery of the
evidence are sufficiently linked to a Charter breach. The question
thus becomes: what type of relationship establishes a sufficient link?
In order to determine when section 24(2) will be engaged, one
must interpret the statutory meaning of "obtained in a manner" visa-vis the infringement of a right or freedom. In R. v. Therens, Le
Dain J. held that the phrase "obtained in a manner" did not require
a strict relationship of causation between the unconstitutional
conduct and the evidence sought to be excluded. 3 5 Le Dain J.
explained:
It is not necessary to establish that the evidence would
not have been obtained but for the violation of the
Charter. Such a view gives adequate recognition to the
intrinsic harm that is caused by a violation of a Charter
right or freedom, apart from its bearing on the obtaining
of evidence. I recognize, however, that in the case of
derivative evidence which is not what is in issue here,
some consideration may have to be given in particular
cases to the question of relative remoteness.36

Thus, the Court in Therens held that a Charter violation must
merely precede or occur in the course of obtaining the evidence.
Three years later, in R. v. Strachan, 37 the Court affirmed this
threshold test and expressly rejected the need for a causation
requirement. Dickson C.J.C. held:
In my view, reading the phrase "obtained in a manner" as
imposing a causation requirement creates a host of
difficulties. A strict causal nexus would place the courts
in the position of having to speculate whether the
evidence would have been discovered had the Charter
violation not occurred. Speculation on what might have

34

See e.g. R. v. St-rachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980; R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138.
R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 at 649.
36 Ibid at 649.
37 Strachan, supra note 34.
35
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happened is a highly artificial task. Isolating the events
that caused the evidence to be discovered from those that
did not is an exercise in sophistry. Events are complex
and dynamic. It will never be possible to state with
certainty what would have taken place had a Charter
violation not occurred. Speculation of this sort is not, in
my view, an appropriate inquiry for the courts. 38

Following Justice Le Dain's reasoning in Therens, the Chief Justice
held that as long as a violation preceded the discovery of the
evidence, it then made little sense to draw distinctions based on the
circumstances surrounding the violation and the type of evidence
discovered. The Court highlighted the importance of a temporal
link, but cautioned that situations will arise where evidence
obtained following the breach of a Charter right will be too remote
from the violation to be "obtained in a manner" that infringed the
Charter. As a result, a case by case approach has evolved which
considers the remoteness of the violation with regard to the
evidence obtained.39
As Fenton notes, R. v. Gran& 0 represents the "high-water mark"
for the application of the test for determining whether evidence was
obtained in a manner that violated the Charter. 41 In Grant the
Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient temporal and
tactical connection between the illegal perimeter searches and the
evidence ultimately offered at trial to attract the provisions of
section 24(2) of the Charter. As Sopinka J. stated:
It is unrealistic to view the perimeter searches as severable
from the total investigatory process which culminated in
discovery of the impugned evidence. Furthermore, to
find otherwise would be to ignore the possible tainting
effect which a Charter violation might have on the
otherwise legitimate components of searches by state
authorities. 42

38

Strachan, supra note 34 at 1002.

39 R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 [hereinafter Burlingham].
R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter Grant].
S. K. Fenton, "Recent Developments in Section 24(2) Jurisprudence" (Federal
Department of Justice Criminal Law Seminar, Toronto, August 1996)
[unpublished] at 17.
42 Grant, supra note 40 at 255.
4o
41
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The Supreme Court of Canada recently reconsidered the test
for triggering section 24(2) in R. v. Goldhart. 43 Writing for the
majority of the Court, Sopinka J. held that section 24(2) did not
apply because there was no temporal connection between the
impugned evidence and the Charter breach. The Court added that
any causal connection was too remote. In an attempt to clear up
what has become a somewhat confusing area of law, Sopinka J.
explained the concepts of causation and remoteness and their
relation to the exclusion of evidence:
Although Therens and Strachan warned against overreliance on causation and advocated an examination of
the entire relationship between the Charter breach and
the impugned evidence, causation was not entirely
discarded. Accordingly, while a temporal link will often
suffice, it is not always determinative. It will not be
determinative if the connection between the securing of
the evidence and the breach is remote. I take remote to
mean that the connection is tenuous. The concept of
remoteness relates not only to the temporal connection
but to the causal connection as well. It follows that the
mere presence of a temporal link is not necessarily
sufficient. In obedience to the instruction that the whole
of the relationship between the breach and the evidence
be examined, it is appropriate for the court to consider
the strength of the causal relationship. If both the
temporal connection and the causal connection are
tenuous, the court may very well conclude that the
evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringes a
right or freedom under the Charter. On the other hand,
the temporal connection may be so strong that the
Charter breach is an integral part of a single transaction.
In that case, a causal connection that is weak or even
absent will be of no importance. Once the principles of
law are defined, the strength of the connection between
the evidence obtained and the Charter breach is a
question of fact. Accordingly, the applicability of s. 24(2)
will be decided on a case-by-case basis as suggested by
Dickson C.J.C. in Strachan.44

43
44

R. v. Goldhart, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 463.
Supra note 43 at 494-495.
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Emphasizing the importance of examining the entire relationship
between the impugned evidence and the illegal search and seizure,
Sopinka ]. held that evidence may be causally related to an initial
Charter breach yet causally too remote to justify exclusion.
Ultimately, Justice Sopinka adopted Justice Rehnquist' s majority
opinion in United States v. Ceccolini:
Witnesses are not like guns or documents which remain
hidden from view until one turns over a sofa or opens a
filing cabinet. Witnesses can, and often do, come
forward and offer evidence entirely of their own volition.
And evaluated. properly, the degree of free will necessary
to dissipate the taint will very likely be found more often
in the case of live-witness testimony than other kinds of
evidence. 4 5

ii. Stage Two: Bringing the Administration ofjustice into Disrepute

Having found a Charter breach, the court must determine whether
the admission of the impugned evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. In Collins, 46 Lamer]. (as he
then was) set out the threefold test for determining whether
evidence ought to be excluded pursuant to Section 24(2) of the
Charter. The Collins test was neatly summarized in R. v. ]acoy, 4 7
where Dickson C.J.C. wrote as follows:
First, the court must consider whether the admission of
evidence will affect the fairness of the trial. If this inquiry
is answered affirmatively, "the admission of evidence
would tend to bring the administration of justice into
disrepute and, subject to a consideration of other factors,
the evidence generally should be excluded" (Collins, p.
284 S.C.R.). One of the factors relevant to this
determination is the nature of the evidence; if the
evidence is real evidence that existed irrespective of the
Charter violation, its admission will rarely render the trial
unfair.

45
46
47

United Statesv. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) at 276-277.
Supra note 29.
R. v.jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548.
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The second set of factors concerns the seriousness of the
violation. Relevant to this group is whether the violation
was committed in good faith, whether it was inadvertent
or of a merely technical nature, whether it was motivated
by urgency or to prevent the loss of evidence, and
whether the evidence could have been obtained without a
Charter violation.
Finally, the court must look at factors relating to the
effect of excluding the evidence. The administration of
justice may be brought into disrepute by excluding
evidence essential to substantiate the charge where the
breach of the Charter was trivial. While this consideration
is particularly important where the offence is serious, if
the admission of the evidence would result in an unfair
trial, the seriousness of the offence would not render the
evidence admissible.4 8

a. Fairness ofthe trial
In assessing what effect the admission of evidence will have on the
fairness of the trial, courts will consider whether the accused has
been conscripted to assist the prosecution. Evidence which emanates
directly from the accused tends to be excluded. Conversely, "real"
evidence (i.e. evidence which exists independent of any
participation by the accused) will rarely be excluded. As LaForest J.
pointed out in R. v. Colarusso:
In this part of the analysis, this court has affirmed that
the classification of evidence as being either "real" or
"conscriptive" is of importance, although, as this court
has noted on other occasions, the mere fact that the
impugned evidence is classified as either real or
conscriptive should not in and of itself be determinative
of the admissibility of the evidence .... 49

This approach is based on the principle that the admission of selfincriminating evidence, manufactured in whole or in part by the
authorities, may bring the administration of justice into disrepute.5°

Supra note 47 at 558-559.
R. v. Colarusso, [1994] l S.C.R. 20 at 74.
50 Supra note 29 at 280-281.

48
49
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Some commentators critique the Court's "real" versus
"conscriptive" evidentiary distinction, and argue that both forms of
evidence flow from a Charter breach and, thus, ought to be subject
to the same exclusionary remedy.51
Regardless of its real or conscriptive nature, the admission of
evidence which could not have been discovered but for the
participation of the accused may render the trial unfair. In
Burlingham, the Supreme Court concluded that the participation of
the accused in the obtaining of the evidence is central to the
question of whether its admissibility would render the trial unfair.
Sopinka J. wrote for the majority:
The rationale for this view is that it is unfair for the
Crown to make out its case in whole or in part by the use
of evidence that it obtained in breach of the rights of the
accused and involving his or her participation.
The participation of the accused in providing
incriminating evidence involving a breach of Charter
rights is the ingredient that tends to render the trial
unfair as he or she is not under any obligation to assist the
Crown to secure a conviction.5 2

More recently, in R. v. Evans,5 3 the Court considered whether
the admission of narcotic evidence discovered following an
unreasonable search could affect the fairness of the trial.
Emphasizing the non-conscriptive nature of the breach, Sopinka J.
held:
[I] would find that the admission of the impugned
evidence would not render the appellant's trial unfair.
The evidence in question is real evidence that existed
irrespective of a Charter violation. Moreover, the
appellants were not conscripted against themselves in the
creation of the evidence, as the evidence pre-existed the
violation of s. 8. Any participation of the accused persons

5!

See e.g. R. J. Delisle, "Collins: An Unjustified Distinction "(1987) 56 C.R. (3d)

216.

52
53

Burlingham, supra note 39 at 290.
R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8 [hereinafter Evans].
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in the discovery of this evidence involving a breach of
their Charter rights was minimal at best.5 4

The Supreme Court has left little doubt that the touchstone of
trial fairness is self-incrimination. The Ontario Court of Appeal
recently echoed this sentiment in R. v. Belnavis.55 After reviewing
the authorities, Doherty J. held that:
... the involvement of the accused in the obtaining of
the evidence remains a touchstone when determining
whether the admission of the evidence would render the
trial unfair. Where evidence pre-exists the breach and is
independent of the accused, but is obtained through the
participation of the accused, then the discoverability of
the evidence without that participation determines
whether the evidence is self-incriminatory. 56

Our justice system has a dear aversion to self-incrimination. Fenton
aptly notes:
Trial fairness, as one of the three organizing principles
under our exclusionary rule is not primarily concerned
with whether the state has gained an evidentiary
advantage as a result of a Charter breach, but rather
whether the state has taken advantage of the accused.
[emphasis in original] 57

b. Seriousness of the breach
While the courts have recognized that a breach of a Charter right is
always a serious matter, not every breach will warrant the exclusion
of evidence.5 8 Some infringements of the Charter will be more
serious than others. Le Dain J. in Therens set out relevant criteria for
determining the seriousness of the Charter violation:
The relative seriousness of the constitutional violation has
been assessed in the light of whether it was committed in
good faith, or was inadvertent or of a merely technical
nature, or whether it was deliberate, willful or flagrant.

Supra note 53 at 26.
55 (1996), 29 O.R (3d) 321 (C.A.).
56 Ibid. at 346.
57 Supra note 41 at 26.
58 Strachan, supra note 34.
54
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Another relevant consideration is whether the action
which constituted the constitutional violation was
motivated by urgency or necessity to prevent the loss or
destruction of the evidence.59

The Collins Court approved these criteria and added that the
availability of alternative investigatory techniques serves to
exasperate the seriousness of the Charter breach.Go
Good faith on the part of police has been held to minimize the
significance of a Charter breach.GI Where police officers reasonably
rely on existing authority for the purposes of investigation, and
their conduct is later found to be unconstitutional, courts will be
much less likely to order exclusion of the evidence.G2 On the other
hand, where police knowingly disregard the law in order to collect
evidence, the breach will be considered more serious and courts will
be much more likely to exclude such evidence.G3 Such was the case
in R. v. Elshaw,G 4 where the Supreme Court excluded incriminating
statements of the accused taken in violation of his right to counsel.
Writing for the majority, Iacobucci J. held that a violation of rights
which jeopardizes the fairness of the trial cannot be saved by
mitigating factors, such as the good faith of the police. G5

c. The effects of exclusion
The last branch of the Collins test requires that courts balance the
effects of excluding impugned evidence against the effects of
admitting such evidence. For example, excluding evidence on the
basis of a purely technical breach of the Charter would tend to
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Conversely,
admitting evidence obtained as a result of a gross violation of the

59 Supra note 35 at 652.

Go Supra note 29 at 285.
GI Note: The Supreme Court's "good faith" reasoning has been the subject of
some criticism. See e.g. S. Coughlan, "Good Faith and Exclusion of Evidence under
the Charter" (1992), 11 C.R. (4th) 304.
G2 See e.g. Grant, supra note 40; Evans, supra note 53.
G3 R. v. Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3; see also The Honourable Justice S. C. Hill,
"The Role of Fault in Section 24(2) of the Charter" in J.C. Camerson, ed., The
Charter's Impact on the Criminal justice System (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) at
57-74.
G4 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24.
G5 Ibid. at 43.
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Charter would also bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. A court must balance these two considerations in light of
the seriousness of the crime with which the accused has been
charged. 66 Furthermore, determining admissibility at this stage calls
for a court to consider the totality of the circumstances.
Section 24(2) was not intended to deter or punish the police for
misconduct committed during the investigative process. As Fenton
points out, the section is directed to the consideration of whether,
misconduct having been found, the administration of justice would
be brought into further disrepute by the admission of evidence
discovered as a result of the misconduct.67

IV. ANALYSIS
1. Purpose of Excluding Evidence
There is a marked difference between the Canadian and the
American approach to the exclusion of evidence. The main
difference lies in the purpose behind the exclusion of evidence. As
mentioned above, the purpose of the American exclusionary rule is
to deter law enforcement officials from engaging in
unconstitutional activities. The purpose of the Canadian
exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is to prevent the
administration of justice from being brought into further disrepute.
These fundamentally different purposes significantly affect the
administration of justice. The automatic exclusion rule is justified
by its deterrent value in the United States. This unforgiving
approach is said to prevent the police from employing
unconstitutional conduct as a last resort investigative technique. If,
for example, the police run out of legitimate avenues or clues, they
may be tempted to "roll the dice" and engage in unconstitutional
behaviour in the absence of an automatic exclusion rule. Even if the
primary evidence is excluded, valuable clues may be gained, which
could lead to derivative evidence. This derivative evidence, under a
less strict regime, may be admissible and sufficient to secure a
conviction. The strict application of the American exclusionary rule
is necessary in order to achieve its deterrent purpose.

66
67

Supra note 29 at 286.
Supra note 41 at 34.
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The Canadian approach, on the other hand, involves a more
elaborate balancing process. This process seeks to achieve results
which will ensure a basic respect for the administration of justice.
The Collins test provides the Crown with a number of opportunities
to justify the admission of evidence. The only area in which the
courts have taken a firm position is in regard to evidence which is
manufactured by the authorities through the accused. This type of
evidence is inadmissible due to its effect on the fairness of the trial.
Once the Crown clears the "fairness of the trial" branch of Collins,
however, the odds of admissibility are quite good. In other words,
the Canadian approach is more tolerant to minor or mere technical
breaches of the Charter.
But a focus on deterrence may not be entirely foreign to
Canadian courts. At least this is one way of explaining Burlingham.
As noted above, the Court concluded that the participation of the
accused in the obtaining of the evidence was central to the question
of trial fairness. Nevertheless, one gets the sense that the Burlingham
Court was attempting to send a message to law enforcement
officials. On this point, Iacobucci J.'s comments are illustrative:
... I underscore that we should never lose sight of the
fact that even a person accused of the most heinous
crimes, and no matter the likelihood that he actually
committed those crimes, is entitled to the full protection
of the Charter: Shortcutting or short-circuiting those
rights affects not only the accused, but also the entire
reputation of the criminal justice system. It must be
emphasized that the goals of preserving the integrity of
the criminal justice system, as well as promoting the
decency of investigatory techniques, are of fundamental
importance in applying s. 24(2). 68

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the Canadian
and American approaches to the exclusion of evidence is not as
fundamentally different as it once was.
2. Evidentiary Presumptions

Another difference between the two approaches is the status of
evidence immediately after it has been held to be the fruit of

68

Supra note 39 at 242.
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unconstitutional conduct. The American approach immediately
labels such evidence prima facie inadmissible as a result of the taint.
In contrast, the Canadian approach deems that the evidence remain
admissible, notwithstanding the taint, until the applicant
demonstrates that its admission will bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. Once the applicant demonstrates that
evidence has been obtained as a result of unconstitutional conduct,
the two approaches differ with respect to the onus requirement. In
the American context, the onus rests with the prosecution to prove
that there has been sufficient attenuation to allow the admission of
evidence. The Canadian approach, on the other hand, requires that
the applicant prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute. This reverse onus requirement obviously makes it
more difficult for the Canadian accused person to obtain an
exclusionary remedy.
3. One-Step versus Two-Step Analysis
The American approach to the exclusion of evidence is often
referred to as a one-step process (i.e. if the evidence is tainted, then
it should be excluded). The Canadian approach, however, is said to
involve two analytical steps: 1) Was the evidence obtained in a
manner which offends the Charter, and, 2) Would the admission of
the evidence bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I
would suggest that the American approach can also be described as
a two-step process. The first stage asks if the evidence was obtained
in an unconstitutional manner. If the evidence was obtained in an
unconstitutional manner, the second stage determines whether the
doctrine of attenuation can sufficiently purge the evidence of its
unconstitutional taint to allow the evidence to be admitted.
Considered in this framework, the American and Canadian
approaches are quite similar. In both jurisdictions, the evidencegathering must be linked to a constitutional infringement, and the
interests of justice must be balanced in determining the ultimate
status of the evidence. While the Canadian approach places more
emphasis on this balancing exercise, the American approach takes
similar considerations into account. Through the attenuation
exceptions, u.s. courts are attempting to preserve the reputation and
effective administration of justice. It is submitted that the
approaches are similar in this regard.

EXCLUSIONARY RULES

283

4. Threshold Tests
Both Canada and the United States utilize fairly low threshold tests
in determining whether there is a connection between a
constitutional violation and the obtaining of evidence. Canadian
courts now require a sufficient temporal and/or causal connection
between the breach and the obtaining of evidence. 69 Courts in the
u.s., on the other hand, require that the evidence be obtained as a
factual consequence of the unconstitutional behaviour. 70 While
some may argue that the American approach requires a strict causal
relationship, it differs little from the approach taken by Canadian
courts. The American approach allows evidence even loosely
connected to unconstitutional behaviour to trigger the exclusionary
rule. The "factual consequences" require little more than a
relationship whereby unconstitutional behaviour somehow led to
evidence. Because of its focus on deterrence, the American approach
is less concerned with the remoteness of the breach. Nevertheless,
both jurisdictions are relatively quick to find that a constitutional
breach has tainted evidence.
5. Discoverability
Another similarity is that both jurisdictions focus on discoverability,
which is to say that evidence obtained through unconstitutional
means may be admissible if it could have been obtained in the
absence of a Charter breach. In R. v. S.(R.j),7 1 Iacobucci J. held that
discoverability is a determinative consideration in Canada. It is
submitted that this is merely the inevitable discovery doctrine
restated. In Burlingham, for example, the Court held that the
murder weapon was inadmissible because it could not have been
found but for the constitutional violation. A murder weapon which
would have been discovered in the course of investigation is,
however, admissible.7 2 In the past, Canadian courts have been
reluctant to exclude real evidence, regardless of discoverability.
Recent decisions in R.j. S. and Burlingham suggest that Canadian
courts are embracing the American approach to discoverability. In
fact, the Canadian position on discoverability is largely a reflection
Supra note 43 at 494-495.
Murrayv. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
7! R. v. S. (R.J), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451 [hereinafter R.J.S.].
72 See e.g. Black, supra note 34.

69

70
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of the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Nixv.

Williams. 73
6. Balancing
Although the purposes for excluding evidence differ between
jurisdictions, both Canada and the United States employ a
balancing component in their analysis. The balancing process in the
Canadian context takes place in the second stage of section 24(2),
with most occurring in the third branch of the Collins test.
Admittedly, the balancing which takes place in the Canadian
approach is more pronounced. Nevertheless, the doctrine of
attenuation has been employed as an exception to ensure that those
who commit crimes are not completely insulated as a result of
unconstitutional conduct. It is submitted that such exceptions have
been created to balance the deterrent purpose with the interests of
justice in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Evidence is excluded for fundamentally different purposes in
Canada and the United States. Each purpose, deterrence and the
promotion of respect for the administration of justice, has
structured the process for excluding evidence in its own unique
way. Although there is a marked difference in the processes
adopted by each jurisdiction, it would appear as though Canada
and the u.s. employ many common principles.
Notwithstanding the similarities between the two jurisdictions,
the Canadian approach to the exclusion of evidence has
incorporated more considerations into the process. While some
may embrace this thoughtful approach, others find it unnecessarily
complicated, preferring instead the American approach which is
arguably more straightforward. Perhaps Canadian courts have also
seen some value in the American approach. In Burlingham, the
Supreme Court of Canada demonstrated a willingness to take
incremental steps toward a new approach to section 24(2) of the
Charter. Sopinka J. stated:

73

Supra note 18 at 441-448.
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Various proposals have been made as to the future
direction that this court should take with respect to s.
24(2). Some would favour an approach that is less
exclusionary and others more exclusionary. It has been
suggested that the distinction between real and other
evidence be eliminated as well as any distinction between
the nature of the Charter right that has been infringed:
see Delisle, supra. It has been proposed that the
distinction based on participation of the accused be
eliminated, and that discoverability be the main
touchstone of admissibility.
While we have not rushed in to adopt eve1y current
theory on the application of s. 24(2), these are serious
proposals that have been and should be taken into
account in the incremental evolution of the jurisprudence
in this area. Accordingly, as my colleague Iacobucci J.
points out, the distinction between real and conscriptive
evidence is not treated as determinative and greater
emphasis has been placed on discoverability or the "but
for" test. . . . In my opinion, we should proceed to
develop the law relating to s. 24(2) on this basis .... 74

Does this passage foreshadow a movement toward the American
approach? R. v. Goldhart suggests otherwise. As Fenton notes:
One false step in an investigation should not immunize
an accused from the probative value of relevant evidence
subsequently discovered unless the value of the truth
seeking function of the criminal trial is outweighed by
the need to protect the accused's right to a fair trial or the
need to deter abusive police practices and avoid the long
term consequences of the regular admission of evidence
gained through serious breaches of the Charter. [emphasis
in original] 75

74

75

Supra note 39 at 448.
Fenton, supra note 41 at 34.

